Document Details: RFP for a project whereby the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority is seeking a maximum of 10 megawatts MW of electrical capacity, allocating approximately 5 MW to each of its two generation facilities serving the districts of St. John and St. The selected respondents will be responsible for constructing, operating, and maintaining all facets of the project. Utility to sign a year power purchase agreement PPA for the procurement of solar energy from one or more selected respondents, with an option to renew for another 5 years.
The Authority seeks photovoltaic generation to assist in lowering the cost of power production in the territory. Legislative documents. More information on the ordinary legislative procedure. Rules of Procedure: Rules TFEU: Article Rules of Procedure: 99 Articles 14 2 , 19 1 , 49, Articles , 2 , Other legislative procedures.
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Article 17 1. Linz, Valenzuela. Elgie [, ], Sartori [, ], Lijphart []. Changing institutional arrangements from one system to another depends on specific aspects inherent to each country history, momentum, balance of power, and so on. Sartori 63 presents an alternative to the multi-cited systems: "alternating presidentialism" or "intermittent presidentialism. Sartori 64 proposes this type of institutional arrangement for Mexico, stating that it would suit the country better than a semi-presidential system: "my suggestion [ I believe alternating presidentialism would be difficult to understand and complicated to implement.
It would most likely not be seen as a positive change, but rather an institutional breakdown. Sartori's proposal would increase competition since the president would be waiting for the parliamentary system to fall apart so he can take it over. Therefore, I propose an alternative solution that could foster cooperation among institutions: unlike "alternating" systems, this would entail "coexistence" so that the system can work as a presidential or semi-presidential one in terms of election results.
This could be achieved by instating three features: i a Head of Congress; ii congressional ratification of cabinet members; and iii line item veto and earmarked preferential initiatives. A Head of Congress HC has to some extent already been included in the Mexican Constitution, which names the president of the Chamber of Deputies the president of the congress. Therefore, only a slight change in name would illustrate the change in its new functions. The HC would be selected from the MCs and elected by a two-thirds vote in the chamber, thus garnering the confidence and support of the legislature.
The president of the Chamber of Deputies would remain in place and aid the HC with procedural duties of the chamber. The HC's main function would be to act as a liaison between the executive and legislative branches. The HC would be included in cabinet meetings but not have a vote. In situations of a divided government, the HC could find common ground to put forward a shared agenda, or simply champion the congress agenda.
In such cases, the government would be more semi-presidential. Cabinet ratification by the legislature is nothing new. My specific proposal is to introduce the ratification process as a constitutional requirement. Appointments would still be a presidential prerogative, but the cabinet would be ratified by a simple majority vote in the chamber.
A recent collaborative study carried out by the Institute for Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico UNAM and the Mexican Senate proposed that certain cabinet members those deemed as being more involved in national and foreign policy should be ratified by the Senate and others, by the Chamber of Deputies.
Although I do not focus on the role of the Senate in this article, I subscribe to this combined process of ratification for cabinet members. Dismissal should still be the prerogative of the executive, but if two thirds of the cabinet opposes the dismissal, the HC would then have the decisive vote. Finally, line item veto and earmarked or preferential initiative should be introduced. Even though the presidential power of absolute veto tends to reinforce the executive's power control over the legislative process , an absolute veto tends to reduce the likelihood of its being implemented.
Also, an absolute veto dismisses an entire initiative when perhaps most of it might be approved or even desired by the president. With a line item veto, the president would be able to publish pieces of good legislation and remove veto the unsustainable parts, without having to restart the complete legislative process.
In terms of preferential initiatives, this has been also proposed by the president. Just as the so-called "pocket veto" was recently eliminated from the constitution thus prohibiting the president from keeping an initiative approved by congress from being published, the preferential initiative would allow the president to present a specified number of initiatives per legislature for congress to discuss in a timely manner.
This would prevent congress from having gatekeeper powers over relevant initiatives. Table 5 shows the possible scenarios for the proposed reforms. The most likely outcome is scenario number 3, as a runoff tends to create a coalition government and a coalition may be expected to perform the same way it does in congress. However, if citizens decide to split their votes as has been happening , scenario number 4 would be more likely. In an effort to rectify some discrepancies that may result from the separation of powers, I believe a combination of the three reforms can reinforce both the executive and legislative branches, as well as, and more importantly, foster cooperation among institutions under a different set of institutional arrangements.
Depending on the specific circumstances stemming from electoral results , the system may work as a purely presidential system while in others, it may work like semi-parliamentary system. Over the past two decades, the Mexican political system has undergone several reforms to adapt the presidential regime to the new conditions of pluralism and citizens' increased demands for accountability. As a result, the system has experienced a significant transformation on establishing more democratic institutions.
Granting independence to each of these institutions to ensure an effective separation of powers has clearly been a positive step towards democratization in Mexico, despite its long history of authoritarian regimes. With the new balance of power and institutional setting, the system has succeeded in becoming an electoral democracy, but still does not have adequate institutional engineering.
Since the PRI instituted electoral reforms that were mainly aimed at enhancing the party's power over other institutions and were reactions to the political atmosphere of the time and growing demands from the opposition, the reforms had some unexpected outcomes and thus the path towards democracy has been harmful.
Regardless of the debate as to which system is better or more effective, institutional arrangements under presidentialism generally present some dangers that need to be addressed.
The Mexican system is no exception, though I believe a measured shift toward a parliamentary system would be less dramatic and therefore preferable. My proposal attempts to correct certain discrepancies that persist in the institutional engineering of Mexico's presidential system by: i introducing a second-round runoff to address issues of legitimacy; ii introducing reelections so that MCs become more accountable to their constituencies than being mainly guided by party interests as mere policy-seekers; and iii establishing a new institutional setting that would foster cooperation among branches by instituting: a a "Head of Congress", which would be in charge of the liaison with the executive and occasionally embrace further responsibilities when the system becomes more semi-presidential ; b the requirement of cabinet ratification by the congress to create a sense of co-responsibility in the executive's performance, and; c the line item veto and preferential or earmarked initiative leading to a more timely legislative process for structural reforms.
These are not only desirable reforms for better government performance and political stability in Mexico; they are also feasible since they do not require major changes in institutional arrangements. Some proposals have already been proposed and are gaining more and more support in the political sphere and more importantly from the civil society. However, it seems to be widely accepted that the success of a system in a country or a region depends on many different factors, such as historical background, education, economic stability, inequality, number of parties, and so forth.
Authors claim this system arises from constitutional engineering. See Pasquino, in Elgie United States , the president can be selected by an electoral college. Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional He states that for a country to be classified as democratic, it must fulfill at least five main features internally and three features externally.
If the country meets all these criteria, it can be classified as an "embedded democracy," whereas if the country fails to comply with even one of them, it should be considered a 'defective democracy', divided into four types of such democracies eg. Merkels' definition of a "delegative democracy" is a system characterized by a weak legislature and judiciary, in which these two branches only have limited control over the executive branch and the president can circumvent the parliament and influence the judiciary.
Haber et al. Wattenberg eds. F] [Federal Electoral Court]. He began a show of "peaceful" resistance which lasted for almost a year. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics. Rationality, Behavior and Institutions W. Norton and Company, INC Before the publication of the article, congress enacted a constitutional reform November introducing some of these features while leaving others for further analysis and deliberation.
Servicios Personalizados Revista. Similares en SciELO. Abstract Over the past two decades, Mexico has gone from an authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy.
Introduction II. Presidential Systems III. Role of Parties and Congress in the Process of Democratization 3. Remaining Threats to Democracy in Mexico 2. Enhancing the Mexican Presidential System A. Endowing Legitimacy to the Executive Mandate B. Reorienting Legislators towards Their Constituencies C. Fostering Cooperation among Branches V. Conclusions I.
Introduction Many scholars have argued that Mexico completed its transition to democracy in the year when the country experienced its first alternation in power. Presidential Systems In the institutional engineering of democratic political regimes, countries can be classified in one of two categories, often referred to as "pure" regimes: 1 parliamentary and presidential.
Transition to Democracy: Evolution of Institutional Arrangements and the Balance of Power Since its independence the history of Mexico has been characterized by an unstable political order and a long list of "monarchs" and "warlords. Post-Revolutionary Period: Conformation of Presidential Power As a result of President Santa Ana's eleven terms in office and Porfirio Diaz's three decades in power during the so-called "Pofriato," one of the principal demands of the revolution was that of banning presidential re-election.
Role of Parties and Congress in the Process of Democratization The "official" party PRI continued to grow over the following years to gradually include a wider range of social sectors. Electoral Reforms of the s and the Subsequent Balance of Power Since the results, further reforms were introduced to the federal electoral law with each party pulling in a different direction. Remaining Threats to Mexican Presidentialism: A Proposal to Enhance the System However, there are still potential threats to presidentialism Characterized by Sartori as "genius" and "unique," 42 Mexican presidentialism has consistently adjusted its institutional arrangements to ensure that the system will continue to work: the "winner-takes-all" situation from an executive perspective, and few inducements to engage in cooperative games with the executive, from a legislative standpoint.
Enhancing the Mexican Presidential System Throughout this article I have attempted to depict a somewhat clear, though not complete, picture of the Mexican presidential system since its creation and the rationale of its composition as it stands today. State governments were much more important.
Today, federal law affects every aspect of our lives. But you cannot trace that change to any constitutional amendment. Some people will say that, all along, the Constitution gave the federal government the potential to play that important role; the federal government just chose not to. Other people might say that the federal government should not be so powerful. There are many examples of this, but here is one that a lot of people overlook.
The Seventeenth Amendment provided that Senators are elected by popular vote. Many people say that the Seventeenth Amendment made an important change in our system, because it took power away from state governments. Having Senators elected by the people, instead of by state legislators, may have been a big change.
But the Seventeenth Amendment did not have much to do with it. Before the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, most states had already cleverly figured out ways to make sure that the people—not state legislators—elected Senators. All of that happened before the Constitution was amended. You can compare this change to a change in the way we elect the President. Formally, the President is elected by electors, not by the voters directly.
Originally, the idea was that electors would be people with good judgment who would make up their own minds about who should be President. Now, for practical purposes, the electors vote automatically for the candidate who won the vote in their state. No constitutional amendment authorized this major change. Congress approved the amendment, but not enough states did, so it never became part of the Constitution. But the Supreme Court interpreted other parts of the Constitution to prevent sex discrimination, and today it is hard to identify any way in which the law would be different if the ERA had been formally added to the Constitution.
The Fifteenth Amendment supposedly guaranteed that people could not be kept from voting because of their race. It was added to the Constitution in But well into the middle of the twentieth century, African-Americans in many parts of the United States were kept from voting by illegal means.
If you just picked up a copy of the Constitution and read it, you would be completely misled about this disgraceful history.
The Fourteenth Amendment , adopted in , had a similar fate. It was intended to prevent many forms of discrimination against minorities. But its promise was not realized until almost a century later, during the civil rights era. A case can be made that the earliest constitutional amendments did matter. That would include the Bill of Rights, for example, and the Twelfth Amendment , which fixed a problem in the way the President and Vice President were originally chosen.
And several amendments have been useful housekeeping measures, like the Twenty-Fifth Amendment , which says what happens if the President is disabled. But if you really want to understand how the United States Constitution changes—in practice, not just on paper—constitutional amendments are a small part of the story. The real action—in many ways, our real Constitution—is elsewhere, in the way the courts, Congress, the President, and the people in their daily lives have brought us the Constitution we have today.
The amendment process, however, has been criticized for having two defects. One is that it is too strict and therefore makes it too difficult to enact amendments.
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